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HARD BARGAINING IN PLEA 
BARGAINING: WHEN DO PROSECUTORS 
CROSS THE LINE? 
Cynthia Alkon* 
Well over 90 percent of all criminal cases in the United States are resolved by 
plea bargaining and not by trial. This means that how plea bargaining works im-
pacts nearly every criminal defendant. However, there are few restrictions to pro-
tect defendants in the negotiating process. One serious problem is that prosecutors 
regularly use hard bargaining tactics such as exploding offers, threats to add en-
hancements, take-it-or-leave-it offers, and threats to seek the death penalty. These 
hard bargaining tactics contribute to the often highly coercive atmosphere of plea 
bargaining that can lead innocent defendants to plead guilty. Pressure to plead 
guilty can also lead defendants to fail to litigate issues, such as search and seizure 
motions. Finally, the coercive atmosphere in plea bargaining can lead defendants 
to accept bad deals as they try to avoid potentially much higher sentences after 
trial. 
This article argues that the U.S. Supreme Court should limit prosecutorial 
hard bargaining tactics in plea negotiations to better protect defendants’ right to 
counsel. In 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court, in Lafler v. Cooper and Missouri v. 
Frye, held that there is a constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel in 
plea bargaining. This article argues that Lafler and Frye demand that the Court 
restrict prosecutorial hard bargaining behavior that interferes with defense law-
yers’ ability to do their jobs and thereby deprives defendants of their constitutional 
right to counsel. Other areas of law, notably labor law, prohibit hard bargaining. 
Under the National Labor Relations Act, unions and companies are required to 
bargain in good faith. Courts have held that some types of hard bargaining act to 
undermine the representation role of the union and are, therefore, a violation of 
the duty to bargain in good faith. This article will suggest that one way to argue 
the Supreme Court should limit prosecutorial hard bargaining is that allowing un-
restricted prosecutorial hard bargaining undermines the representation of counsel 
and thereby prevents effective assistance of counsel in plea bargaining. This article 
also gives specific examples of what kinds of prosecutorial hard bargaining tactics 
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should be restricted to better protect defendants’ constitutional rights in the plea 
bargaining process. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Imagine a case where the defendant was arrested and charged a with a theft 
offense. He is facing a maximum of ten years in prison. The prosecutor offers 
him a deal of five years in prison. However, if the defendant refuses the deal, the 
prosecutor threatens to charge him under a habitual-offender statute which would 
increase the sentence to a mandatory term of life in prison due to the defendant’s 
two prior felony convictions. In this situation, the defendant is faced with a dif-
ficult choice: fight the case and risk life in prison, or accept the plea deal of five 
years in prison, perhaps for something he did not do. 
Prosecutors regularly threaten to add charges, to add enhancements, or to 
seek more time, as part of the plea-bargaining process. But, does this kind of hard 
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bargaining, regardless of how routine it is, cross the line and create an overly 
coercive plea-bargaining environment that violates defendants’ constitutional 
rights? Since the U.S. Supreme Court first held that plea bargaining was consti-
tutional in Brady v. United States, they have allowed prosecutorial hard bargain-
ing.1 In Brady, the Court held the fact that the prosecution was threatening the 
death penalty if the defendant rejected the plea deal did not invalidate the de-
fendant’s guilty plea, as the defendant pled voluntarily and with “sufficient 
awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.”2 Eight years 
later, in Bordenkircher v. Hayes, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the facts de-
scribed at the beginning of this article did not constitute a violation.3 The Court 
noted that the prosecutor simply “openly presented the defendant with the un-
pleasant alternatives of forgoing trial or facing charges on which he was plainly 
subject to prosecution, [and therefore] did not violate the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.”4 
 Plea bargaining is the predominant form of criminal-case resolution in the 
United States. 94 percent to 97 percent of criminal cases are resolved by guilty 
pleas and not through trials.5 Plea bargaining is so common that there are coun-
ties that report having no criminal trials.6 The few cases that tend to go to trial 
are more serious offenses and, even then, it is only a small percentage.7 Individ-
uals arrested and charged in the United States will most likely resolve their crim-
inal case through plea bargaining. This means that how plea bargaining works 
impacts nearly every criminal defendant.  
In recent years, the Court has shown an increasing interest in plea bargain-
ing,8 acknowledging the fact that “criminal justice today is for the most part a 
system of pleas, not a system of trials.”9 However, so far, the Court has focused 
only on questions of competent assistance of counsel in the counseling phase of 
                                                        
1  Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 751–52 (1970). 
2  Id. at 748, 751. 
3  Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 358–59, 365 (1978). 
4  Id. at 365. 
5  See, e.g., Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012). 
6  Marisa Gerber, No Criminal Trials Held in Santa Cruz Since 2010, SANTA CRUZ VALLEY 
SUN (Feb. 8, 2012), http://www.nogalesinternational.com/scv_sun/news/no-criminal-trials-he 
ld-in-santa-cruz-county-since/article_2651fbde-5269-11e1-b903-0019bb2963f4.html [https:// 
perma.cc/NR99-ZBVE]. 
7  For example, 25 percent of trials in Texas were capital murder cases and a further 21 percent 
were non-capital murder cases. OFFICE OF COURT ADMIN., ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT FOR 
THE TEXAS JUDICIARY 35 (2006), http://www.txcourts.gov/media/454891/Published-Annual-
Report-2006.pdf [https://perma.cc/R6W5-QKJN]. Murder convictions come from trials much 
more frequently than convictions for other felonies. BRIAN A. REAVES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
STATE COURT PROCESSING STATISTICS, 1990-2002 (2006) https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/as 
cii/vfluc.txt [https://perma.cc/7VSJ-LAQX]. 
8  See generally Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399; Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012); Padilla v. 
Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010). 
9  Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1381. 
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plea bargaining and has not looked at larger issues surrounding the plea-bargain-
ing atmosphere, including prosecutorial behavior.10 In cases where the Court has 
dealt with questions about prosecutors’ actions in plea bargaining, it has, with 
few exceptions, not found that prosecutors engaged in unconstitutional behav-
ior.11 
Is it time for the Court to start to place more meaningful limits on prosecu-
torial hard bargaining behavior? Prosecutorial hard bargaining tactics contribute 
to what is often a coercive plea bargaining atmosphere.12 The coercive atmos-
phere in plea bargaining can lead innocent defendants to plead guilty. Pressure 
to plead guilty can also lead defendants to fail to litigate issues, such as search 
and seizure motions. Finally, the coercive atmosphere in plea bargaining can lead 
to defendants accepting bad deals as they try to avoid potentially much higher 
sentences after trial. These problems do not exist only due to prosecutorial hard 
bargaining;13 however, prosecutorial hard bargaining contributes to these prob-
lems. 
This article argues that yes, in light of the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent in-
terest in plea bargaining, it is time to consider whether and how it might be ap-
propriate to restrict prosecutorial hard bargaining practices. This article will 
begin in Part I by giving a working definition of hard bargaining and describing 
the types of hard bargaining practices that are both routine and highly problem-
atic. Part II will discuss the concern that hard bargaining practices are coercive 
and lead innocent defendants to plead guilty, that hard bargaining inhibits litiga-
tion of issues, and that it leads defendants to accept bad deals. Part III will review 
the law as it currently exists in plea bargaining and the few constraints that the 
Court has placed on prosecutorial behavior. Part IV will examine whether hard 
bargaining practices in plea bargaining are a violation of the right to fundamental 
fairness. Part IV will conclude that it is unlikely that the Supreme Court will 
reverse long-standing case law which has allowed hard bargaining tactics and 
has not found such behavior to be a violation of fundamental fairness. 
                                                        
10  Jenny Roberts, Effective Plea Bargaining Counsel, 122 YALE L.J. 2650, 2653 (2013). For 
a longer discussion recommending that the Court look beyond the counseling phase to deter-
mine whether a defendant had competent assistance of counsel, see generally Cynthia Alkon, 
Plea Bargain Negotiations: Defining Competence Beyond Lafler and Frye, 53 AM. CRIM. L. 
REV. 377 (2016). 
11  See, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 365 (1978). 
12  See, e.g., Russell Covey, Reconsidering the Relationship Between Cognitive Psychology 
and Plea Bargaining, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 213, 242–43 (2007) (“The routine use of high-pressure 
bargaining tactics and exploding offers, and the ever-present threat that next time one might 
find himself or herself standing before an even more vindictive or unreasonable judge, places 
added psychological stress on criminal defendants.”); see also Cynthia Alkon, The U.S. Su-
preme Court’s Failure to Fix Plea Bargaining: The Impact of Lafler and Frye, 41 HASTINGS 
CONST. L.Q. 561, 598–601 (2014). 
13  For a more extensive discussion of the complexity of plea bargaining and the structural 
realities of the criminal justice system that make reform efforts aimed at just one part of the 
process unlikely to bring far-reaching change, see generally Alkon, supra note 12. 
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Since it is unlikely the Court will find that prosecutorial hard bargaining is a 
violation of fundamental fairness, Part V will consider whether labor law, and 
the prohibition of hard bargaining tactics in the labor context, might provide a 
useful example of an argument that is more likely to prevail to place limits on 
hard bargaining in plea bargaining. Under the National Labor Relations Act, un-
ions and companies are required to bargain in good faith.14 Courts have held that 
some types of hard bargaining, when viewed from the entirety of the bargaining 
behavior, have acted to undermine the representation role of the union and were, 
therefore, a violation of the duty to bargain in good faith. Part VI will build on 
this approach and suggest that one way to argue the U.S. Supreme Court should 
limit prosecutorial hard bargaining is that allowing unrestricted hard bargaining 
tactics undermines the representation of counsel and thereby prevents effective 
representation of counsel in plea bargaining. The Court has shown a willingness 
in recent years to examine more critically the defense role in plea bargaining in 
the cases of Padilla v. Kentucky,15 Lafler v. Cooper,16 and Missouri v. Frye.17 
The Court may, therefore, be ready to look more critically at the totality of cir-
cumstances that defense lawyers are operating under and to agree that certain 
prosecutorial hard bargaining tactics work to undermine the defense function and 
thereby violate the right to effective assistance of counsel. Part VII will discuss 
specific examples of the kinds of prosecutorial hard bargaining tactics should be 
restricted. 
Restricting the most egregious examples of prosecutorial hard bargaining 
will not alone fix the problems of coercion in plea bargaining. This is due to the 
fact that an underlying reason for the coercive atmosphere in plea bargaining is 
the possibility of extreme penalties that are part of every penal code in the United 
States.18 Preventing prosecutors from using certain hard bargaining tactics will 
not fix that underlying structural problem. However, it is time that the U.S. Su-
preme Court look more critically at prosecutorial behavior. 19 The Court should 
                                                        
14  National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (2012). 
15  Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010). 
16  Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012). 
17  Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012). 
18  For a more extensive discussion of the need for criminal code reform as part of plea-bar-
gaining reform see Cynthia Alkon, What’s Law Got to Do With It? Plea Bargaining Reform 
After Lafler and Frye, 7 Y.B. ON ARB. & MEDIATION 1 (2015), https://works.bepress.com/cyn-
thia_alkon/44 [https://perma.cc/BSV3-N77M]. For a critique of reform proposals from an ear-
lier era see Albert W. Alschuler, Sentencing Reform and Prosecutorial Power:  A Critique of 
Recent Proposals for “Fixed” and “Presumptive” Sentencing, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 550, 563 
(1978) (criticizing sentencing reform proposal for not limiting prosecutorial discretion in plea 
bargaining  as “[a]ny reform of sentencing practices, whether great or small and whether taking 
the form of fixed sentences, presumptive sentences or sentencing guidelines, can be undercut 
by the practice of plea bargaining”).  
19  This article does not intend to suggest that a Supreme Court decision is the only route to 
limit hard bargaining tactics and/or coercive practices in plea bargaining.  For an article sug-
gesting that judicial involvement in plea negotiations may help to minimize or limit such co-
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place limits on some forms of hard bargaining to restrict at least some prosecu-
torial behavior to better protect defendants’ constitutional rights in the plea bar-
gaining process. 
I.   HARD BARGAINING 
In the negotiation literature, hard bargaining can refer to a vast array of ne-
gotiation tactics that fall broadly under the category of adversarial,20 competi-
tive,21 distributive,22 positional,23 or zero-sum bargaining.24 These terms are often 
used interchangeably to describe a type of negotiation behavior that is not prob-
lem-solving,25 cooperative,26 integrative,27 or interest based.28 However, this ar-
ticle is not using the term “hard bargaining” in this broad sense, but rather is 
defining hard bargaining to be specific prosecutorial tactics in plea bargaining 
that make further negotiation nearly impossible and leave the defendant with an 
immediate, or near-immediate, decision of whether to take the deal or go to trial.  
                                                        
ercive practices see Nancy J. King & Ronald F. Wright, The Invisible Revolution in Plea Bar-
gaining: Managerial Judging and Judicial Participation in Negotiations, 95 TEX. L. REV. 325, 
383 (2016) (reporting interview results where defense lawyers, prosecutors, and judges re-
ported that “judicial involvement made an already coercive situation a little less so”).  For a 
recommendation that judges regulate prosecutors,  see Samuel J. Levine, The Potential Utility 
of Disciplinary Regulation as a Remedy for Abuses of Prosecutorial Discretion, 12 DUKE J. 
CONST. L. & PUB. POL'Y 1 (2016) (recommending reform of prosecutorial discretion by judges 
who can use existing power to supervise prosecutorial charging decisions through ethical 
rules); see also Bruce A. Green & Samuel J. Levine, Disciplinary Regulation of Prosecutors 
as a Remedy for Abuses of Prosecutorial Discretion:  A Descriptive and Normative Analysis, 
14 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 143 (2016).  
20  See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The Struc-
ture of Problem Solving, 31 UCLA L. REV. 754, 764–65 (1984) (“[I]n the pure adversarial 
case, each party wants as much as he can get of the thing bargained for, and the more one party 
receives, the less the other party receives.” (footnote omitted)). 
21  See, e.g., GERALD R. WILLIAMS, LEGAL NEGOTIATION AND SETTLEMENT 18–42 (1983) (cat-
egorizing negotiators as either cooperative or competitive). 
22  See, e.g., Menkel-Meadow, supra note 20, at 765 n.35. 
23  See, e.g., ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT 
WITHOUT GIVING IN 40–55 (Bruce Patton ed., 2d ed. 1991) (explaining the difference between 
positions and interests). 
24  For an explanation of the origin of the term zero sum, see Menkel-Meadow, supra note 20, 
at 756 n.4. 
25  See, e.g., Andrea Kupfer Schneider, Shattering Negotiation Myths: Empirical Evidence on 
the Effectiveness of Negotiation Style, 7 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 143, 171, 179–81 (2002). 
26  See, e.g., WILLIAMS, supra note 21, at 18–42. 
27  See, e.g., CARRIE J. MENKEL-MEADOW ET AL., NEGOTIATION: PROCESSES FOR PROBLEM 
SOLVING 89 (2006). 
28  See, e.g., FISHER & URY, supra note 23, at 40–55. For a more general discussion about the 
variety of labels describing negotiation styles see Andrea Kupfer Schneider, Teaching a New 
Negotiation Skills Paradigm, 39 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 13, 16–18 (2012). 
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Even under this narrower definition, prosecutorial hard bargaining tactics 
are routine.29 But, this is not to suggest that every plea negotiation or even a 
majority of plea negotiations include hard bargaining tactics. Young and less ex-
perienced prosecutors may use hard bargaining tactics.30 Prosecutors who are 
difficult people or who think that all negotiations should be highly adversarial 
may use hard bargaining tactics. Prosecutors who have political motivations, 
such as wanting to show they are “tough on drunk driving” may use hard bar-
gaining tactics.31 Prosecutors who want to manage their caseloads may use hard 
bargaining tactics.32 Prosecutors may also use hard bargaining tactics on some 
cases when they are, for whatever reason, reacting more emotionally to the case 
and want to ensure a conviction. And, in cases that bring even greater concern, 
prosecutors may use hard bargaining tactics to cover up for a weak case where 
they are concerned they might not otherwise secure a conviction or when they 
are worried that they will lose in an expected search and seizure motion. It is 
hard to know how frequently hard bargaining tactics are used, as there are so few 
empirical studies of the plea bargaining process itself.33 However, the likely fact 
that prosecutors are not using hard bargaining tactics in the majority of their cases 
does not mean that there is not a need for restrictions and better rules to prevent 
them. 
Examples of hard bargaining tactics include “exploding offers”—when a 
prosecutor threatens that the deal is good “today only” or for some other re-
stricted time period (such as until the case is called in court). Another standard 
hard bargaining tactic is for the prosecutor to threaten to add an enhancement, 
such as the use of a gun, which adds mandatory minimum jail time. A third hard 
bargaining tactic is to threaten to add additional charges that carry additional 
time, sometimes also as a mandatory minimum. A fourth hard bargaining tactic 
is to phrase the offer as a “take-it-or-leave-it” offer and refuse any further nego-
tiation. Last, a fifth hard bargaining tactic is when prosecutors threaten to pro-
ceed with the case as a death penalty case unless the defendant takes the deal. As 
will be discussed below, prosecutors often use more than one hard bargaining 
tactic in the same case. 
                                                        
29  See, e.g., G. NICHOLAS HERMAN, PLEA BARGAINING 75–87 (Juris Publishing, Inc. 3d ed., 
Lexis Law Publishing 1997) (2012) (listing various “common” plea bargaining tactics, includ-
ing hard bargaining tactics such as setting deadlines, overcharging, threats, and take-it-or-
leave-it plea offers). 
30  For an interesting discussion of the dynamics at play with less experienced prosecutors, see 
Ronald F. Wright & Kay L. Levine, The Cure for Young Prosecutors’ Syndrome, 56 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 1065 (2014). 
31  See, e.g., JILL PAPERNO, REPRESENTING THE ACCUSED: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO CRIMINAL 
DEFENSE 212 (2012) (discussing how prosecutors may not have discretion and may have to 
follow office-wide policies). 
32  Id. (discussing the general pressure prosecutors feel to resolve cases, not specifically the 
use of hard bargaining tactics). 
33  Jenny Roberts & Ronald F. Wright, Training for Bargaining, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
1445, 1451 (2016). 
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A.   Exploding Offers 
Plea offers are often made with time limits attached. Prosecutors can place 
time limits on a plea offer for legitimate reasons. For example, if a case involves 
child witnesses or sexual-assault victims, making an offer that is good until the 
first proceeding when the child or sexual-assault victim may have to take the 
witness stand and testify is appropriate. The goal in these circumstances would 
be to protect the victims from having to testify. However, exploding offers are 
often made with no reason beyond pressuring the defendant to take the deal. This 
happens in both misdemeanor and felony cases.34 Defendants are routinely put 
in the position of having to decide on the day of the arraignment, which is often 
the first day they are meeting and talking with their lawyer, whether to accept a 
plea deal or not. 35  Prosecutors routinely tell defendants and their lawyers that if 
they reject the deal that is good “today only,” they will face a higher sentence as 
the prosecutor will never again make that “low” plea offer. In some cases, pros-
ecutors will make a specific threat, such as, “today I’m offering 6 months in the 
county-jail; if you don’t accept this deal today, the next time out, the best we will 
do is 3 years in state prison.”36 
B.   Threats to Add Enhancements 
Over the last four decades, penal codes have been amended and revised to 
allow the same act to be charged in a variety of ways.37 One of the standard 
changes in penal codes has been the addition of a number of enhancements that 
can add time to the underlying criminal offense.38 Often these enhancements, 
                                                        
34  The consequences of conviction are also serious in misdemeanor cases, see, for example, 
Jenny Roberts, Why Misdemeanors Matter: Defining Effective Advocacy in the Lower Crimi-
nal Courts, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 277 (2011) “Two ways in which the quality of misdemeanor 
representation matters more today than ever before merit particular attention: the proliferation 
of criminal records and the related phenomenon of an explosion in collateral consequences for 
minor criminal convictions.” Id. at 287. 
35  A recent study of adult and youth in New York found that nearly half of the youths had less 
than one hour to decide about whether to accept the plea deal in their case. See Tina M. Zottoli 
et. al., Plea Discounts, Time Pressures, and False Guilty Pleas in Youth and Adults Who 
Pleaded Guilty to Felonies in New York City, 22 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 250 (2016). Only 
one-third had more than a day to make their decision. Id. at 254. The study found that nearly 
60 percent of the adults reported they had “more than a day to make their plea decisions” with 
28.6 percent reporting “they had less than an hour.” Id. 
36  These threats can exert even more pressure when the defendant is in custody and the offer 
is a time-served deal, or will simply end the misery of more court appearances.  See Zottoli et. 
al., supra note 35, at 256; see also Alkon, supra note 12, at 600–01. 
37  See, e.g., 42 C.J.S. Indictments § 204 (2016); JAMES AUSTIN ET AL., UNLOCKING AMERICA: 
WHY AND HOW TO REDUCE AMERICA’S PRISON POPULATION 1, 3–4 (2007), http://www.jfa-as-
sociates.com/publications/srs/UnlockingAmerica.pdf [https://perma.cc/5SAK-859R]. 
38  See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 12022.53(b) (West 2016) (“[A]ny person who, in the com-
mission of a felony specified in subdivision (a), personally uses a firearm, shall be punished 
by an additional and consecutive term of imprisonment in the state prison for 10 years. The 
firearm need not be operable or loaded for this enhancement to apply.”). 
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once added to the offense, add mandatory time.39 This means that if the defendant 
is convicted of the offense, including the enhancement, the judge will not be able, 
under the law, to sentence the defendant to anything but the mandatory time.40 
For example, the offense of selling a controlled substance has one penalty, but if 
the sale was in a school zone, additional time is added.41 Gun use and prior crim-
inal convictions are also standard enhancements that can add serious time. One 
example, from the federal system, is the case of Lulzim Kupa who was charged 
with distributing cocaine and rejected the initial plea offer.42 However, two 
weeks prior to his trial date, the prosecution gave notice of two prior marijuana 
convictions.43 The addition of these two prior convictions increased the possible 
penalty to life in prison.44 The federal system has no parole, so life in prison is 
life without parole.45 Mr. Kupa then agreed to accept a plea offer, was sentenced 
to eleven years in prison, and the prosecution agreed to withdraw the notice of 
the prior convictions.46 While prosecutors might have had legitimate reasons for 
waiting to add the notice of prior convictions until after Mr. Kupa rejected the 
plea deal, the timing is suspect and it appears to have been done to exert pressure 
on Mr. Kupa to take the deal. 
Criminal codes allow for extreme mandatory penalties if prosecutors add the 
right enhancement. Once the enhancement is added and the defendant is con-
victed at trial, the law often does not allow the sentencing judge to exercise any 
discretion. However, the prosecution has the discretion to withdraw the enhance-
ment as part of a plea deal, which ultimately happened with Mr. Kupa. 
C.   Threats to Add Additional Charges 
Just as criminal codes now allow for a variety of possible enhancements, 
there are also a variety of ways in which the same act can be charged. For exam-
ple, many acts can be charged as either felonies or misdemeanors. In addition, 
                                                        
39  See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 775.087(2) (2016) (“[D]ischarged a ‘firearm’ or ‘destructive device’ 
as defined in s. 790.001 shall be sentenced to a minimum term of imprisonment of 20 years.”). 
40  See, e.g., Morgan Whitaker, Marissa Alexander Could Face 60 Years, MSNBC (Mar. 11, 
2014, 8:12 AM), http://www.msnbc.com/politicsnation/marissa-alexander-could-face-60-
years [https://perma.cc/2M8H-G6HG] (“Absent a plea agreement, if convicted as charged, the 
law of the State of Florida fixes the sentence . . . .”). 
41  See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 21a-278a(b) (2015). 
42  HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, AN OFFER YOU CAN’T REFUSE: HOW US FEDERAL PROSECUTORS 
FORCE DRUG DEFENDANTS TO PLEAD GUILTY 5 (2013), https://www.hrw.org/report/2013/12/ 
05/offer-you-cant-refuse/how-us-federal-prosecutors-force-drug-defendants-plead [https://pe 
rma.cc/K9C2-KUTN]. 
43  Id. 
44  Id. 
45  Congress eliminated federal parole with the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3551. Stanley A. Weigel, The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984: A Practical Appraisal, 36 
UCLA L. REV. 83, 104 (1988). 
46  HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 42. 
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the same act can result in one criminal charge or multiple criminal charges, de-
pending on how the prosecutor chooses to look at it.47 One example of this is the 
case of Marissa Alexander.48 Ms. Alexander was originally charged with one 
count of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon in Florida.49 The case started 
when Ms. Alexander shot her gun in the air “one time” during a fight with her 
estranged husband.50 Ms. Alexander’s defense was that on the day in question, 
her husband grabbed her neck and threatened to kill her.51 The trial judge, in 
error, shifted the burden of proof in the “stand your ground” defense to Ms. Al-
exander during jury instructions.52 The jury convicted Ms. Alexander, and due to 
the mandatory “use-a-gun” law53 in Florida, Ms. Alexander was sentenced to 
twenty years in prison.54 Ms. Alexander’s case was overturned on appeal due to 
an error in the jury instructions and sent back for a re-trial.55 Before her first trial, 
the prosecution offered three years in prison in exchange for her pleading guilty 
to aggravated assault (without the gun-use allegation).56 Ms. Alexander rejected 
that deal and went to trial.57 After the appellate court ordered a re-trial, the pros-
ecutor added additional charges of aggravated assault, one for each of her two 
children who were present, in addition to her estranged husband.58 Those addi-
tional charges made the possible maximum sentence sixty years in prison, be-
cause there was a mandatory twenty year “use-a-gun” allegation with each 
charge.59 Ms. Alexander ultimately chose to take the three-year plea deal that the 
                                                        
47  This may be also be overcharging, depending on the circumstances. See Kyle Graham, 
Overcharging, 11 OHIO ST. J. OF CRIM. L. 701, 706–13 (2014). 
48  I have previously used the example of Ms. Alexander’s case and my statement of the facts 
here is drawn from that previous work. See Alkon, supra note 18, at 17–18. 
49  Fla. Mom Gets 20 Years for Firing Warning Shots, CBS NEWS (July 15, 2013, 11:02 AM), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/fla-mom-gets-20-years-for-firing-warning-shots 
[https://perma.cc/667L-TCQA]. 
50  Id. 
51  Aliyah Frumin, Marissa Alexander Accepts Plea Deal, MSNBC (Jan. 27, 2015, 11:47 PM), 
http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/marissa-alexander-accepts-plea-deal [https://perma.cc/43RZ-
BUD5]. 
52  Alexander v. State, 121 So. 3d 1185, 1186, 1188 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013). 
53  FLA. STAT. § 775.087(2) (2016). 
54  Fla. Mom Gets 20 Years for Firing Warning Shots, supra note 49 (“Under Florida’s man-
datory minimum sentencing requirements Alexander couldn’t receive a lesser sentence, even 
though she has never been in trouble with the law before.”). 
55  Alexander, 121 So. 3d at 1186. 
56  Julia Dahl, Fla. Woman Marissa Alexander Gets 20 Years for “Warning Shot”: Did She 
Stand Her Ground?, CBS NEWS (May 16, 2012, 4:21 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/ news/ 
fla-woman-marissa-alexander-gets-20-years-for-warning-shot-did-she-stand-her-ground 
[https://perma.cc/UH2D-ZEGK]. 
57  Id. 
58  Whitaker, supra note 40. 
59  Id. The prosecutor stated that the additional charges were necessary due to a change in the 
law. Id. 
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prosecutor eventually offered again. By that time, Ms. Alexander was just weeks 
away from completing the three-year term.60 
D.   Take-It-or-Leave-It Offers 
Related to and often accompanying threats to add enhancements and charges 
are take-it-or-leave-it offers. The prosecution may decide early on in the case 
that only a certain penalty is appropriate and refuse to negotiate. This happens in 
the context of “standard deals” when certain kinds of cases are routinely plea 
bargained for the same punishment. Driving-under-the-influence-of-alcohol and 
drug-possession cases are examples of cases that often have standard offers. The 
Aaron Swartz case provides an example of prosecutors using stiff penalties in 
the existing law and refusing to negotiate beyond a take-it-or-leave-it offer.61 
Aaron Swartz was an activist who thought there should be free access to infor-
mation on the internet.62 He used the network at the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology (MIT) to download articles from the database JSTOR.63 Mr. Swartz 
intended to make the information freely available and never intended to sell it or 
profit from it.64 Initially, Mr. Swartz was charged with four counts of violating 
federal computer-fraud and abuse statutes, which carried a maximum of thirty 
years in prison and a $1 million fine.65 Fourteen months later, the Department of 
Justice indicted Mr. Swartz on thirteen counts of violating federal computer-
fraud and abuse statutes, increasing the possible penalty to fifty years in prison.66 
Mr. Swartz had no prior criminal record. JSTOR was not “interest[ed] in this 
becoming an ongoing legal matter” as all of the information was returned.67 
                                                        
60  Frumin, supra note 51. 
61  For more information on Aaron Swartz see, for example, David Uberti, Inquiry Widens into 
Swartz Prosecution, BOS. GLOBE (Feb. 28, 2013, 12:59 AM), http://www.bos-
ton.com/news/local/massachusetts/2013/02/28/house-committee-broadens-inquiry-into-aa-
ron-swartz-case/mELDGN9wEuRKDghyhdcnxL/story.html [https://perma.cc/T42H-2LU9]; 
see also Emily Bazelon, When the Law Is Worse than the Crime: Why Was a Prosecutor Al-
lowed to Intimidate Aaron Swartz for so Long? SLATE (Jan. 14, 2013, 3:59 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/technology/2013/01/aaron_swartz_suicide_prose-
cutors_have_too_much_power_to_charge_and_intimidate.html [https://perma.cc/REG9-KJD 
L]. 
62  Uberti, supra note 61. 
63  Id. 
64  Id. 
65  Indictment, United States v. Swartz (D. Mass. July 14, 2011) (No. 11-CR-10260-NMG), 
http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/217117-united-states-of-america-v-aaron-swartz 
[https://perma.cc/7QUC-YXCA]; 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2012). 
66  Superseding Indictment at 240, United States v. Swartz (D. Mass Sept. 12, 2012) (No. 11-
CR-10260-NMG), https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/555334/1-11-cr-10260-
nmg.pdf [https://perma.cc/L9FC-EKDT]; 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2012); 18 U.S.C. § 1030(c)(1)(B) 
(2012). 
67  See JSTOR Statement: Misuse Incident and Criminal Case, JSTOR, http://about.jstor.org/ne 
ws/jstor-statement-misuse-incident-and-criminal-case [https://perma.cc/KD8P-YYLK] (last 
visited Nov. 17, 2016). 
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The prosecutor offered Mr. Swartz six months in custody in exchange for 
pleading to several felony counts. Mr. Swartz rejected the offer.68 On January 13, 
2013, a year and half after the prosecution began, Mr. Swartz committed sui-
cide.69 Mr. Swartz’s suicide led to a flurry of questions about the aggressive pros-
ecution and the plea-bargaining process in his case. Mr. Swartz’s family and 
friends argued that the aggressive prosecution was a contributing factor to his 
suicide.70 One commentator asked “[i]f [the prosecutor] thought that Swartz only 
deserved to spend 6 months in jail, why did she charge him with crimes carrying 
a maximum penalty of 50 years?”71 Darrell Issa, the Chairman of the House 
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, asked, “Are we using excess 
prosecution, excess claims in order to force guilty pleas?”72 In a letter to then-
Attorney General Eric Holder, the House Committee asked questions about the 
plea offers and how the charges and offers compared to other cases prosecuted 
under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act.73 During the hearing itself, Texas 
Senator John Cornyn said, “I’m concerned that average citizens, if you can call 
them that, like Aaron Swartz, people who don’t have status and power, perhaps, 
in dealing with the federal government, could be bullied.”74 
Mr. Kupa’s drug case and Ms. Alexander’s assault case also both seem to 
have been “take-it-or-leave-it” plea offers as there is no record of alternative of-
fers or any negotiation between the parties beyond the single offer made by the 
                                                        
68  Spencer E. Ante et al., Legal Case Strained Troubled Web Activist, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 13, 
2013, 9:14 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014241278873245815045782386920482 
00404 [https://perma.cc/EPT8-6B6C]; Alex Fitzpatrick, Aaron Swartz Plea Deal Reportedly 
Rejected Days Before His Death, MASHABLE (Jan. 14, 2013), http://mashable.com/2013/01/ 
14/aaron-swartz-plea-deal/#x3QRHRTxgkqS [https://perma.cc/2GQL-PRWJ]. 
69  See, e.g., Timothy B. Lee, Internet Pioneer and Information Activist Takes His Own Life, 
ARS TECHNICA (Jan. 12, 2013, 11:10 AM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/01/inter-
net-pioneer-and-information-activist-takes-his-own-life [https://perma.cc/93GX-QM8R]. 
70  Suicide and mental illness are complex, but see Amanda Holpuch, Aaron Swartz Girlfriend 
Blames Suicide on “Vindictiveness” of Prosecution, GUARDIAN (Jan. 18, 2013), 
http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/jan/18/aaron-swartz-suicide-girlfriend-inter-
net-reddit [https://perma.cc/J4R3-PLLM]. There were also calls to reform the law that prose-
cutors used to charge Mr. Swartz. See generally, Austin C. Murnane, Note, Faith and Martyr-
dom: The Tragedy of Aaron Swartz, 24 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1101 
(2014). 
71  Timothy B. Lee, Aaron Swartz and the Corrupt Practice of Plea Bargaining, FORBES (Jan. 
17, 2013, 12:50 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/timothylee/2013/01/17/aaron-swartz-and-
the-corrupt-practice-of-plea-bargaining/#188e4e7e3a0d [https://perma.cc/R4L8-EWXZ]. 
72  Uberti, supra note 61. 
73  Letter from Darrell E. Issa, Chairman, Cong. Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform, and 
Elijah E. Cummings, Ranking Member, Cong. Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform, to 
Eric H. Holder, Attorney General (Jan. 28, 2013), http://www.oversight.house.gov/wp-con-
tent/uploads/2013/01/2013-01-28-DEI-EEC-to-Holder-re-Aaron-Schwartz-prosecution.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9FH8-S57A]. 
74  David Uberti, Holder Defends Swartz Prosecution, BOS. GLOBE (Mar. 7, 2013), 
http://www.bostonglobe.com/news/politics/2013/03/06/attorney-general-eric-holder-de-
fends-aaron-swartz-prosecution-before-senate-commit-
tee/fsOapaK6rymx5OqF1ZPfCK/story.html [https://perma.cc/4HTD-3HT2]. 
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prosecution.75 Both cases also carried potentially high sentences if the defendant 
refused the plea deal. The problem with take-it-or-leave-it offers, especially 
when combined with potentially heavy sentences after trial, is that defendants 
often consider cases with a good defense (such as Ms. Alexander’s case) to be 
too risky to take to trial. Prosecutors can ratchet up the possible penalties on 
weaker cases, such as Ms. Alexander’s case, and refuse to negotiate a better deal 
(for example, insisting that first time offenders must go to prison), and leave 
defendants with the choice either to plead guilty to charges of which they may 
not be guilty, or to accept higher sentences than the case may deserve. 
E.   Threats to Seek the Death Penalty 
A threat to seek the death penalty can be considered a threat to add an en-
hancement or a new charge (depending on the jurisdiction). But this prosecutorial 
threat is different because it threatens to impose the ultimate penalty. In the con-
text of this discussion, therefore, it is potentially even more coercive, although it 
involves a smaller sub-set of defendants. 
It is not unusual for the defendant to offer to plead guilty in exchange for life 
in prison without parole in death penalty cases.76 However, this is when the pros-
ecution has already filed the charges, or sought an indictment, for the case as a 
death penalty case. Although there is undoubtedly pressure to accept any offered 
plea deal in a death penalty case, the concern, for purposes of this discussion, is 
those cases where the prosecution is using the possibility of the death penalty as 
leverage to extract a guilty plea. 
II.   CONCERNS WITH COERCION DUE TO HARD BARGAINING 
Coercion in plea bargaining is not new and is something that plea bargaining 
critics have discussed for decades.77 Hard bargaining can be one factor in creat-
ing an overly coercive atmosphere where defendants are faced with potentially 
                                                        
75  In Ms. Alexander’s case, there is no record that prosecutors offered any deal other than the 
original three-year offer. See Fla. Mom Gets 20 Years for Firing Warning Shots, supra note 
49 (“Corey (the prosecutor) initially offered Alexander a three year deal if she pleaded guilty 
to aggravated assault, but . . . Alexander did not believe she had done anything wrong, and 
rejected the plea.”).   
76  One example is the movie theater shooting case in Colorado. See Michael Winter, James 
Holmes Offers Guilty Plea to Avoid Death Penalty, USA TODAY (Mar. 27, 2013, 5:48 PM), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/03/27/colorado-theater-killings-guilty-
plea-offer/2025809 [https://perma.cc/QX7W-4DCZ]. 
77  See, e.g., H. Mitchell Caldwell, Coercive Plea Bargaining: The Unrecognized Scourge of 
the Justice System, 61 CATH. U. L. REV. 63 (2011); John H. Langbein, Torture and Plea Bar-
gaining, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 3, 12 (1978); Steven F. Gillers, Justice By Consent: Plea Bargains 
in the American Courthouse, 5 HOFSTRA L. REV. 217 (1976) (reviewing ARTHUR ROSETT & 
DONALD R. CRESSEY, JUSTICE BY CONSENT: PLEA BARGAINS IN THE AMERICAN COURTHOUSE 
(1976)); see also Maximo Langer, Rethinking Plea Bargaining:  The Practice and Reform of 
Prosecutorial Adjudication in American Criminal Procedure, 33 AM. J. CRIM. L. 223, 229–47 
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serious consequences if they reject a plea offer or are forced to make quick and 
serious decisions about whether to take the deal. One of the primary concerns of 
plea bargaining critics is that the overly coercive atmosphere in plea bargaining 
can put pressure on innocent defendants to plead guilty. It can also put pressure 
on defendants to not litigate legal issues. Finally, defendants may end up accept-
ing deals that aren’t good deals, or even appropriate sentences, but are just not as 
bad as they could be. 
A.    Innocent Defendants 
A standard concern of plea bargaining critics is that innocent defendants 
plead guilty due to the overall coercive atmosphere of plea bargaining.78 Unfor-
tunately, we now know that innocent people plead guilty in the United States.79 
For example, 17 percent of those exonerated in 2013 first pled guilty to the 
charges.80 Overall, out of the 344 DNA exonerations nationwide, thirty-six (or 
just over 10 percent) pled guilty to the crime before being exonerated.81 One rea-
son that innocent people may plead guilty is because “the offer is too good to 
refuse,”82 which is tied to defendants evaluating the possible maximum com-
pared to the plea offer.83 Innocent defendants may also be more risk averse than 
the guilty and, therefore, more likely to take deals.84  
                                                        
(2006) (discussing, in part, whether a guilty plea is coerced when defendants have no “rational 
choice” but to plead guilty). 
78  See, e.g., Alkon, supra note 12, at 573–75 and accompanying notes; see also Albert W. 
Alschuler, A Nearly Perfect System for Convicting the Innocent, 79 ALB. L. REV. 919, 939 
(2016) (“All in all, the American legal system is brilliant. The system makes it in the interest 
of defense attorneys as well as prosecutors and judges to convince defendants to plead 
guilty…this system is nearly perfectly designed to convict the innocent.”). 
79  See, e.g., DNA Exonerations in the United States, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.inno-
cenceproject.org/free-innocent/improve-the-law/fact-sheets/dna-exonerations-nationwide 
[https://perma.cc/BK5J-96G7] (last visited Nov. 17, 2016); NAT’L REGISTRY OF 
EXONERATIONS, https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/browse.aspx [https:// 
perma.cc/YQ8W-CA6R] (last visited Nov. 17, 2016); see also WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 21.2(b) (4th ed. 2015) (describing inducements by prosecutors, and 
how the Department of Justice changed its policy in 2010 and no longer requested that defend-
ants waive their right to future DNA testing at the time of the guilty plea due to the recognition 
that “factually innocent people plead guilty.”). 
80  Timothy Williams, Study Puts Exonerations at Record Level in U.S., N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 4, 
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/04/us/study-puts-exonerations-at-record-level-in-
us.html?_r=1 [https://perma.cc/ZU9N-ZQ7C]. 
81  INNOCENCE PROJECT, supra note 74. 
82  Russell D. Covey, Plea-Bargaining Law After Lafler and Frye, 51 DUQ. L. REV. 595, 617 
(2013). 
83  For an article arguing that innocent defendants may get better deals and that concerns about 
an “innocence problem” in plea bargaining are “misguided,” see Josh Bowers, Punishing the 
Innocent, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1117 (2008). 
84  For an interesting study finding that innocent people are highly likely to take plea deals, 
especially in the face of serious consequences if they reject the deal, see generally Lucian E. 
Dervan & Vanessa A. Edkins, The Innocent Defendant’s Dilemma: An Innovative Empirical 
Study of Plea Bargaining’s Innocence Problem, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1 (2013). But 
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B.   Failure to Litigate Issues 
Defendants who might be guilty of the underlying offense, may still have 
other legal issues that could lead to the case being dismissed. For example, if the 
evidence was gathered through an illegal search, it could lead to the case being 
dismissed if the search and seizure motion is granted. However, every defense 
lawyer knows these motions are not easy to win. Prosecutors also know this and 
will regularly make an offer that is contingent on the defense not litigating any 
motions. This might lead to an acceptable outcome for the individual defendant, 
but it can have larger and more serious policy concerns. Litigating motions can 
help prosecutors and judges uncover larger problems, such as police officers who 
are acting abusively and illegally. 
C.   Taking Bad Deals 
Another concern of plea-bargaining critics is that defendants are treated dif-
ferently depending on where they are arrested, and who they are.85 There are 
serious, and well-documented, concerns that African-American and Latino de-
fendants receive higher sentences for similar offenses than do white defendants.86 
Defendants may get higher sentences depending on who the prosecutor is and 
what the particular prosecutor offers. If there is no oversight, or if the prosecu-
tor’s office agrees with the higher offers, defendants often find they have no op-
tion but to take the bad deal, because the sentence after conviction at trial would 
be worse.87 
III.   WHAT THE LAW RESTRICTS OR ALLOWS PROSECUTORS TO DO IN PLEA 
BARGAINING 
As has been observed by others, there are few rules regulating the plea bar-
gaining process itself.88 The Court has held that a guilty plea must be voluntary 
and intelligent.89 The Court has said this means that the defendant must under-
stand what he is doing, act freely and knowingly, and accept (or decline) a plea 
                                                        
see Oren Gazal-Ayal & Avishalom Tor, The Innocence Effect, 62 DUKE L.J. 339, 339 (2012) 
(arguing that “innocents are significantly less likely to accept plea offers that appear attractive 
to similarly situated guilty defendants.” (italics omitted)). 
85  See generally Nancy J. King et al., When Process Affects Punishment: Differences in Sen-
tences After Guilty Plea, Bench Trial, and Jury Trial in Five Guidelines States, 105 COLUM. 
L. REV. 959 (2005); see also 5 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 79, § 21.1(e). 
86  See, e.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE 
OF COLORBLINDNESS 56, 99 (2d ed. 2012). See generally, King et al., supra note 85. 
87  For a longer discussion of the trial penalty see Alkon, supra note 12, at 603–05. 
88  See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market: From Caveat Emptor 
to Consumer Protection, 99 CAL. L. REV. 1117, 1117–19 (2011) (cited in Lafler v. Cooper, 
132 S. Ct. 1376, 1387 (2012)); Darryl K. Brown, Lafler, Frye and Our Still-Unregulated Plea 
Bargaining System, 25 FED. SENT’G. REP. 131 (2012); see also Covey, supra note 77, at 596. 
89  Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 747 (1970). 
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bargain without physical coercion.90 In addition, there must be some showing on 
the record that the defendant is, in fact, knowingly and voluntary giving up con-
stitutional rights and pleading guilty.91 Due to this requirement, statutory plea-
bargaining rules tend to focus on the rights a defendant will waive and what must 
be put on the record as part of the plea colloquy.92  
There are few rules dictating how prosecutors should approach the plea bar-
gaining process. In general, the Court gives great deference to prosecutorial dis-
cretion.93 The U.S. Supreme Court rarely finds prosecutorial behavior in plea 
bargaining to be a violation of a defendant’s rights.94 One such example is when 
the Court remanded a case where the prosecutor failed to stick to the original 
plea agreement after the defendant entered his plea of guilty95 because to do oth-
erwise would be an “unfulfilled promise” or governmental deception.96 In so 
holding, the Court made it clear that prosecutors should not breach previous 
agreements.97 However, the Court has not considered threats of worse punish-
ment or of additional charges to be illegal coercion. For example, in Brady, the 
Court decided that the defendant’s decision to take the deal to avoid the death 
penalty was not a violation.98 In Brady, the Court held that the defendant accepted 
the deal knowingly and voluntarily, and that a prosecutor’s threat to seek the 
death penalty if the deal was not accepted was not coercive because the death 
                                                        
90  Id. at 748–50. 
91  Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242–43 (1969). 
92  For a longer discussion, see Alkon, supra note 12, at 572. 
93  See, e.g., United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996); see also Bordenkircher v. 
Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978) (saying that when “the prosecutor has probable cause to 
believe that the accused committed an offense defined by statute, the decision whether or not 
to prosecute, and what charge to file or bring before a grand jury, generally rests entirely in 
his discretion.”). 
94  Prosecutors are rarely disciplined for misconduct, although some scholars argue that pros-
ecutorial misconduct is getting more attention. See Bruce Green & Ellen Yaroshefsky, Prose-
cutorial Accountability 2.0, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 51, 115 (2016) (“Information technology 
has served as a catalyst for change. . . There has been a shifting discourse about prosecutorial 
misconduct, its causes, and potential remedies.”). 
95  Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262–63 (1971) (“[W]hen a plea rests in any signif-
icant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of 
the inducement or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled.” Additionally, “appropriate 
recognition of the duties of the prosecution in relation to promises made in the negotiation of 
pleas of guilty will be best served by remanding the case.”). 
96  Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 505 (1984) (distinguishing the facts from Santobello). 
97  Santobello, 404 U.S. at 265. The fact that the prosecutor who made the agreement is no 
longer handling the case does not change this as “[t]he staff lawyers in a prosecutor’s office 
have the burden of ‘letting the left hand know what the right hand is doing’ or has done. That 
the breach of agreement was inadvertent does not lessen its impact.” Id. at 262. 
98  Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 755 (1970). 
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penalty could be lawfully imposed.99 The Court has also held that it is not a vio-
lation of due process if a prosecutor threatens to re-indict the defendant with 
more serious charges if he refuses the plea deal.100 
IV.   FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS 
Josh Bowers argues that fundamental fairness has been more important than 
accuracy in looking at the Supreme Court’s plea bargaining decisions.101 Bowers 
observed that the Court is concerned about “unfair surprise” in Brady, Santo-
bello, and Bordenkircher, despite finding unfair surprise only in Santobello.102 
Bowers observed, however, that the Court authorized hard bargaining in Borden-
kircher.103 The distinction is that in Bordenkircher, “the defendant was not sur-
prised by the added charge, and, thus, he could make no constitutional claim.”104 
The Court has not yet found hard bargaining practices to be a violation of funda-
mental fairness in plea bargaining. 
As the Court is starting to look more critically at plea bargaining, it is time 
to look again at whether prosecutorial hard bargaining practices, such as those 
discussed above, violate the right to fundamental fairness in plea bargaining. 
However, given the already-established line of cases and the Court’s well-estab-
lished deference to prosecutorial discretion, it seems unlikely that the Court will 
change course now and find routine prosecutorial hard bargaining tactics, as de-
fined by this article,105 violate a defendant’s right to fundamental fairness in plea 
bargaining. However, as will be discussed below, arguing that prosecutorial hard 
bargaining is a violation of the right to counsel might be a more likely step for 
the Court to take, as it would not require overruling previous cases but would 
simply build off more recent decisions. 
V.   GOOD FAITH REQUIREMENT 
Many criminal practitioners view good faith through the singular lens of the 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.106 In the context of Fourth 
                                                        
99  Id. at 750–51. 
100  Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364–65 (1978). William J. Stuntz stated, “In retro-
spect, Bordenkircher appears to be one of the great missed opportunities of American consti-
tutional law.” William J. Stuntz, Bordenkircher v. Hayes: The Rise of Plea Bargaining and 
the Decline of the Rule of Law (Harvard Pub. Law Working Paper No. 120, 2005), http://pa-
pers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=854284 [https://perma.cc/QWE2-MX4H]. 
101  See generally Josh Bowers, Fundamental Fairness and the Path from Santobello to Padilla: 
A Response to Professor Bibas, 2 CAL. L. REV. CIR. 52, 54 (2011). 
102  Id. at 59. 
103  Id. 
104  Id. 
105  See supra Part I. 
106  U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”). 
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Amendment and search and seizure law, good faith is one exception to the ex-
clusionary rule which allows evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amend-
ment to be used against the defendant.107 However, good faith, as it has devel-
oped in some areas of negotiation, provides protection against bad behavior by 
requiring that parties negotiate in good faith, including not engaging in some 
specific hard bargaining tactics, such as take-it-or-leave-it offers.108 The National 
Labor Relations Act (NLRA) imposes a duty to bargain in “good faith.”109 In the 
labor context, “ ‘good faith’ bargaining lacks clear parameters, but a ‘totality of 
conduct’ standard has given way to a list of proscribed behaviors, such as disen-
gaging from the negotiations and presenting take-it-or-leave-it offers.”110 Failing 
to reach an agreement or a party’s refusing to make a concession is not usually 
enough to constitute bad faith under the NLRA.111 The analysis of whether a 
party has failed to act in good faith is “contextual and considers whether the to-
tality of a party’s conduct demonstrates bad faith . . . .”112 
The classic example of bad faith and hard bargaining is NLRB v. General 
Electric Co..113 In this 1969 case, the Second Circuit held that General Electric 
violated the good faith requirement114 through a practice known as “Boul-
wareism”.115 The practice was named after the Vice-President for Labor Rela-
tions of General Electric, Lemuel R. Boulware, who decided that the company 
would make a “firm, fair offer” only as a “take-it-or-leave-it” offer.116 Looking 
at the totality of the circumstances, the court held that General Electric’s “cam-
paign of unbending firmness” combined with “the take-it-or-leave-it approach” 
was evidence of its bad faith.117 
                                                        
107  See, e.g., PHILLIP A. HUBBART, MAKING SENSE OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE LAW: A FOURTH 
AMENDMENT HANDBOOK 384–92 (2d ed. 2015); 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: 
A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 1.3 (5th ed. 2012). Thank you to Professor Eliza-
beth Phillips Marsh for pointing out this distinction. 
108  See, e.g., Del Monte Fresh Produce, Inc. v. Int’l Longshoremen Warehouse Union Local 
142, 146 P.3d 1066, 1079 (Haw. 2006). See generally John Lande, Using Dispute System De-
sign Methods to Promote Good-Faith Participation in Court-Connected Mediation Programs, 
50 UCLA L. REV. 69, 78, 83 (2002) (giving examples of good faith requirements in the context 
of mediation, a facilitated negotiation). 
109  See National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (2012); Russell Korobkin et al., The 
Law of Bargaining, 87 MARQ. L. REV. 839, 842 (2004); see also 1 THE DEVELOPING LABOR 
LAW 913–22 (John E. Higgins, Jr. et al. eds, 6th ed. 2012). 
110  Korobkin et al., supra note 103, at 842; see also 1 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra 
note 103, at 914–22 (discussing how courts have defined and viewed the “totality of con-
duct.”). 
111  DOUGLAS E. RAY ET AL., UNDERSTANDING LABOR LAW 163 (2d ed. 2005). 
112  Id. at 164. 
113  NLRB v. Gen. Elec. Co., 418 F.2d 736, 746, 756 (2d Cir. 1969). 
114  Id. at 763. 
115  RAY ET AL., supra note 111, at 164–65. 
116  Id. at 164. 
117  Id. at 165. 
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In addition, and most importantly for the purposes of this discussion, the 
Second Circuit held that this approach by General Electric meant that the com-
pany was bargaining “as though the Union did not exist, in clear derogation of 
the Union’s status as exclusive representative of its members” under the National 
Labor Relations Act.118 Historically, companies in the United States resisted bar-
gaining with union representatives.119 The right to union representation under the 
NLRA has policy objectives that are tied to the history of labor unions and to the 
very specific goal to protect the right of union representation in collective bar-
gaining, which can help to prevent labor unrest from disintegrating into vio-
lence.120 Therefore, one goal of the good-faith requirement in the NLRA was to 
stop the practice when “employers politely met with the union representatives, 
listened to their demands and the supporting arguments and then rejected 
them.”121 
This requirement has extended to prevent “surface bargaining,”122 where one 
party appears to engage in bargaining on the surface “while concealing a pur-
poseful strategy to make bargaining futile and to avoid reaching an agree-
ment.”123 The question is “whether, from the context of a party’s total conduct, 
the party is lawfully engaged in hard bargaining to achieve a contract it desires 
or is unlawfully endeavoring to frustrate the possibility of arriving at any agree-
ment.”124 
Clearly, some parts of the good-faith requirement in the labor context do not 
translate well to plea bargaining. For example, in labor negotiations there is a 
statutory duty to bargain.125 The duty to bargain in the NLRA is a direct response 
to the concern that the failure to bargain leads to labor strife and violence. There 
is no similar duty or right to engage in plea negotiations because plea bargains 
are entirely discretionary, and it is up to the prosecutor to decide whether or not 
to make an offer.126 Criminal cases are different from labor cases and there are 
                                                        
118  Gen. Elec. Co., 418 F.2d at 763 (citing NLRB v. Herman Sausage Co., 275 F.2d 229, 234 
(5th Cir. 1960)). 
119  See, e.g., Archibald Cox, The Duty to Bargain in Good Faith, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1401, 
1403–06 (1958). 
120  The NLRA was intended to promote industrial peace. RAY ET AL., supra note 105, at 10; 
see also, Cox, supra note 113, at 1406–07 (“Prior to 1935 the outright refusal of employers to 
deal with a labor union was a prolific cause of industrial strife.”). 
121  Cox, supra note 119, at 1410. 
122  1 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 109, at 922–30. 
123  Marc Mandelman & Kevin Manara, Staying Above the Surface—Surface Bargaining 
Claims Under the National Labor Relations Act, 24 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 261, 261 
(2007). 
124  Id. at 272. 
125  RAY ET AL., supra note 111, at 161–62. 
126  See, e.g., Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 561 (1977). Thus far no court has found 
that a defendant has a right to a plea bargain. But see Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1397 
(2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Today, however, the Supreme Court of the United States ele-
vates plea bargaining from a necessary evil to a constitutional entitlement.”). In the labor con-
text, refusing to negotiate is bad faith. Mandelman & Manara, supra note 123, at 268. 
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times when there are good reasons not to make plea offers. For example, in some 
more serious cases, there is a single possible punishment (for example, life in 
prison), and there may be no reason for the prosecutor to reduce the charge to 
offer a lower sentence. Also, given the overwhelming use of plea bargaining to 
resolve cases, the concern in the criminal justice system is not the failure to plea 
bargain, but the potential overuse of the process. Related to this is the concern 
that the pressure to plead guilty may prevent defendants from exercising their 
constitutional right to trial. 
I am not, therefore, suggesting that a good-faith requirement should be 
adopted in plea bargaining that copies the requirement in labor cases. Instead, I 
am suggesting that it is appropriate to consider whether concepts developed in 
labor law are applicable as one possible way to impose limits on prosecutorial 
conduct in plea bargaining. Specifically, as will be discussed in the next section, 
it is time to consider whether the concept of hard bargaining tactics undermining 
the right of representation could be applied in the context of plea bargaining. 
VI.   RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
Unlike the right to representation in the labor context, the right to counsel in 
criminal cases is not solely statutory, but is also constitutional.127 However, as 
discussed above, the U.S. Supreme Court has only recently begun to elaborate 
what the right to effective assistance of counsel is in the plea-bargaining context 
through the 2010 case of Padilla v. Kentucky,128 and the 2012 companion cases 
of Lafler v. Cooper129 and Missouri v. Frye.130 In Lafler and Frye the Court held 
there is a right to effective assistance of counsel in plea bargaining.131 The Court 
has, however, limited its analysis to effective assistance of counsel in the client-
counseling phase of plea bargaining.132 Due to the Court’s seemingly renewed 
interest in plea bargaining, it is time to consider whether hard bargaining tactics 
effectively undermine the representational function, as has been found in the la-
bor context. If yes, then it is time to consider these prosecutorial behaviors a 
violation of the right to effective assistance of counsel. 
                                                        
127  U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
128  Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1486 (2010). 
129  Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1385. 
130  Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1413–14 (2012). 
131  Id. at 1408; Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1384. 
132  Roberts, supra note 10, at 2653. 
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A.   How the Court Has Defined the Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel133 
The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees the ac-
cused, in criminal cases, the right “to have the Assistance of Counsel for his de-
fense.”134 However, as Chief Justice Burger observed, “[t]he right to counsel has 
historically been an evolving concept.”135 In 1932, in Powell v. Alabama, the 
U.S. Supreme Court held that defendants had a right to appointed counsel under 
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in the limited context of 
capital cases.136 The Court further limited this right to circumstances when the 
defendant was “incapable adequately of making his own defense because of ig-
norance, feeble-mindedness, illiteracy or the like . . . .”137 It took another six years 
before the Court recognized in Johnson v. Zerbst the right to appointed counsel 
in federal cases under the Sixth Amendment,138 rather than under the due process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 139 It was not until twenty-five years later, 
in 1963, that the Court in Gideon v. Wainwright extended a Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel to defendants charged with felonies in state cases.140 It took the 
Court another nine years to hold that defendants had a right to counsel before 
being sentenced to any jail time, including for misdemeanors, unless they spe-
cifically waived the right.141 Four years after Gideon, the Court held the right to 
counsel exists at the critical stages when “substantial rights of a criminal accused 
may be affected.”142 
Twenty-one years after Gideon, in Strickland v. Washington, the Court cre-
ated a two-prong test to determine whether a lawyer provided adequate assistance 
of counsel.143 The first prong asked whether a lawyer’s performance “fell below 
an objective standard of reasonableness.”144 The second prong, under Strickland, 
                                                        
133  I have previously described the case law on the right to counsel and this section draws from 
that previous work. See Alkon, supra note 10, at 381–83. 
134  U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
135  Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 44 (1972) (Burger, C.J., concurring). 
136  Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 73 (1932). See 3 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 74, § 11.1(a)–
(b), for a discussion of this case in the context of the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. This was the infamous Scottsboro case in which nine African-American young 
men were tried without lawyers and sentenced to death for rape. See generally John D. King, 
Beyond “Life and Liberty”: The Evolving Right to Counsel, 48 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 10 
(2013); Sara Mayeux, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel before Powell v. Alabama: Lessons 
from History for the Future of the Right to Counsel, 99 IOWA L. REV. 2161 (2014), for a history 
of the right to counsel before Powell. 
137  Powell, 287 U.S. at 71. 
138  3 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 74, § 11.1(a). 
139  Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462 (1938). 
140  Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339–45 (1963); see also 3 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 
74, § 11.1(a). 
141  Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972). 
142  Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 134 (1967); see also 3 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 74, 
§ 11.2(b). 
143  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687–700 (1984). 
144  Id. at 688. 
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required the defendant to show that, but for this deficient performance by their 
lawyer, the result would be different.145 Strickland was a death penalty case that 
went to trial, and the Court stated that the “purpose” of the Sixth Amendment 
right to effective counsel was “to ensure a fair trial.”146 The Court went on to say 
that “[t]he benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether 
counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial pro-
cess that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.”147 
Although the Court applied the Strickland two-prong test to plea bargaining 
in earlier cases,148 it was not until 2010, in Padilla v. Kentucky, that the Court 
held a defense lawyer violated the Strickland standards in plea bargaining.149 In 
Padilla, the lawyer failed to advise the defendant about the immigration conse-
quences of his guilty plea.150 The Court concluded that “[t]he weight of prevail-
ing professional norms supports the view that counsel must advise her client re-
garding the risk of deportation.”151 
In 2012, the Court found that the defense lawyers’ performance failed to 
meet the Strickland effectiveness standard during the plea-bargaining phase in 
Missouri v. Frye152 and Lafler v. Cooper.153 In Frye, the Court explained that the 
first prong had been met as the defendant’s lawyer had failed to perform at the 
required standard.154 In Lafler, the Court explained how the second prong can be 
established in the context of plea bargaining.155 “[A] defendant must show the 
outcome of the plea process would have been different with competent ad-
vice.”156 In both Lafler and Frye, the Court refers to Hill v. Lockhart, a case in 
which the defendant alleged ineffective assistance of counsel because his lawyer 
told him he would be eligible for parole before he actually was, in fact, eligible 
for parole.157 The Court found that the defendant failed to establish that but for 
the incorrect advice, the defendant would not have taken the plea deal.158 In Hill, 
as in Lafler, Frye, and Padilla, the Court was examining the question of whether 
the lawyer was effective solely during the counseling phase of the plea bargain. 
                                                        
145  Id. at 693. 
146  Id. at 686. 
147  Id. (emphasis added). 
148  Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985). 
149  Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1482 (2010). 
150  Id. at 359–60. 
151  Id. at 367. 
152  Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1408–09 (2012). 
153  Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1384–85 (2012). 
154  Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1408–09. 
155  Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1384–85. 
156  Id. at 1384. 
157  Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1384; Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1409; Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 54–55 
(1985). 
158  Hill, 474 U.S. at 60. 
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Despite examining how the defense lawyer performed, the Court was clear 
when it decided Strickland in 1984, that it will not be too critical of defense law-
yers as “[j]udicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly deferen-
tial.”159 The Court went on to say that “a court must indulge a strong presumption 
that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional as-
sistance.”160 Then the Court gave the “out” that it has since used in numerous 
cases, stating that the defendant needs to overcome the presumption that the law-
yer was engaging in “sound trial strategy.”161 The Court also stated “advocacy is 
an art and not a science”162 to help explain why these strategic choices should be 
“respected.”163  
Due to the Court’s favoring “deference,” the Strickland standard is not an 
easy standard for defendants to meet.164 Justice Stevens acknowledged this in 
Padilla when he wrote “[s]urmounting Strickland’s high bar is never an easy 
task.”165 The Court has found that the Strickland two-prong test was violated in 
plea-bargaining cases only during the counseling phase of the plea-bargaining 
process. However, Padilla, Lafler and Frye open the door for the Court to look 
more critically at the role of defense lawyers during plea bargaining beyond the 
counseling phase and, as I argue below, also to demand that the Court look more 
critically at how prosecutorial behavior may be undermining the right to counsel. 
B.   Do Hard Bargaining Tactics Undermine the Right To Counsel? 
In the labor context, the failure to negotiate, or to refuse to negotiate with a 
union, constitutes negotiating in bad faith and is an unfair labor practice under 
the NLRA.166 Plea bargaining as a process, unlike collective bargaining, has 
grown largely outside the law and with minimal legal regulation. As stated 
above, the Court has subjected neither prosecutors nor defense lawyers to great 
scrutiny in terms of the plea negotiation process.167 But, as the labor context il-
lustrates, hard bargaining tactics can act to usurp the representational role. 
Unlike in labor cases, the concern is not that hard bargaining practices cut 
off negotiation and settlement, but rather that hard bargaining practices back de-
fendants into corners and leave them with little choice but to plead guilty. Hard 
                                                        
159  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984). 
160  Id. 
161  Id.; see also, e.g., Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1404 (2011); Harrington v. Richter, 
562 U.S. 86, 106–11 (2011). 
162  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 681. 
163  Id. 
164  For a more detailed analysis of Strickland see generally, for example, Gary Feldon & Tara 
Beech, Unpacking the First Prong of the Strickland Standard: How to Identify Controlling 
Precedent and Determine Prevailing Professional Norms in Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
Cases, 23 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1 (2012). See also 3 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 79, 
§ 11.10(c). 
165  Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 371 (2010). 
166  See supra Part V. 
167  See supra Part III; see also supra Section VI.A. 
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bargaining in those circumstances can make the plea bargaining process nothing 
more than a charade because the defense lawyer does not, in fact, bargain, but 
simply conveys the offer and advises her client of the serious consequences of 
turning down the offer. For example, in the Marissa Alexander case, the addition 
of charges and gun-use allegations ratcheted up the potential penalty.168 This was 
combined with the prosecutor apparently standing fast in offering the same plea 
bargain as was offered before the first trial.169 This scenario is all too common, 
leaving the defense lawyer  with little to do but convey the offer, again, and to 
discuss the serious potential penalty if the defendant chooses to go to trial. 
Essentially, these hard bargaining tactics are the criminal justice system’s 
equivalent of “surface bargaining,” in that plea offers are made, but without the 
intention to engage in real bargaining. The difference is that in the context of 
plea negotiations, the goal of hard bargaining is to force a settlement, instead of 
intending not to reach agreement. 
One of the challenges with making this argument is that, thus far, the Court 
has examined effective assistance of counsel only in the counseling phase, not 
the negotiation phase of plea bargains. In explaining this limitation, Justice Ken-
nedy stated: 
Bargaining is, by its nature, defined to a substantial degree by personal style. The 
alternative courses and tactics in negotiation are so individual that it may be nei-
ther prudent nor practicable to try to elaborate or define detailed standards for the 
proper discharge of defense counsel’s participation in the process.170 
The court would have to move beyond this narrow and inaccurate view of 
negotiation for this argument to work.171 
VII.  WHICH HARD BARGAINING TACTICS SHOULD BE RESTRICTED? 
As in the labor context, the challenge is determining when prosecutorial hard 
bargaining tactics in plea bargaining cross the line. Borrowing from labor cases, 
the totality of the circumstances should be considered in determining whether the 
particular prosecutor has crossed over the line in a particular case. The discussion 
below is intended as an attempt to start the discussion, recognizing the inherent 
difficulty in deciding when to restrict hard bargaining tactics and which hard 
bargaining tactics to restrict. One challenge in placing restrictions on hard bar-
gaining tactics is doing so in a way that will not invite prosecutors to work around 
the restrictions and engage in essentially the same hard bargaining tactics. This 
challenge is one reason why it is difficult to place meaningful limits on prosecu-
torial hard bargaining tactics as isolated plea bargaining reform without also 
                                                        
168  Whitaker, supra note 40. 
169 See Fla. Mom Gets 20 Years for Firing Warning Shots, supra note 49. 
170  Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1408 (2012) (emphasis added). 
171  See generally Alkon, supra note 10, at 389, for a more extensive discussion of how the 
court can and should look beyond the counseling phase and look at the preparation and nego-
tiation phases of plea bargaining. 
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amending criminal codes that allow for extreme penalties, enhancements, and 
mandatory minimums.172 However, despite this challenge, it is important to start 
to define what kinds of prosecutorial hard bargaining tactics should be subject to 
regulation. 
A.   Exploding Offers 
This might be the easiest category to consider. In ordinary criminal cases, 
prosecutors should not rush defendants in their decision of whether to accept a 
deal or not. No defendant should be forced to decide on the day of arraignment 
whether to take a particular plea offer.173 As noted above, there can be good rea-
sons to place time limits on offers—but those reasons should be clearly stated on 
the record and should involve goals beyond simply moving the docket. It should 
be acceptable to limit an offer until the day a child victim or victim of a violent 
crime, including sexual assault, would have to come to court and testify. It should 
not, however, be acceptable for prosecutors to keep offers open only until a po-
lice officer testifies. Testifying is part of a police officer’s official duties. As 
such, there would ordinarily be no reason to pressure defendants to accept plea 
deals to spare police officers from testifying. 
Defendants should never face the choice between taking an offer and getting 
discovery on a case. The U.S. Supreme Court has not yet held that defendants 
have a right to all discovery, prior to plea bargaining.174 However, as a basic rule, 
prosecutors, even in jurisdictions without open file discovery rules, should not 
make a plea offer at arraignment that is good only for that day. This is due to the 
concern that, as a practical matter, forcing pleas at arraignment shuts off the de-
fendant’s ability to get full discovery in the case. If there is a good reason to 
resolve cases at arraignment, prosecutors and courts should allow the defense to 
continue the arraignment until a day when the defense will have full discovery 
and will have had an opportunity to speak to the defendant about the case and 
about options. If a defense lawyer does not have full discovery in the case, she 
cannot competently advise her client about what to do. This includes whether 
                                                        
172  See generally Cynthia Alkon, An Overlooked Key to Reversing Mass Incarceration: Re-
forming the Law to Reduce Prosecutorial Power in Plea Bargaining, 15 U. MD. L.J. RACE, 
RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 191 (2015), for a longer discussion of the need for criminal code 
reform to better restrict prosecutorial behavior. 
173  This can be even more important for juvenile defendants or defendants with cognitive 
disabilities. See Zottoli et. al., supra note 35 at 255–56 (“It is fairly well established that deci-
sion-making competence breaks down when individuals have to make decisions in short peri-
ods of time, especially if these decisions involve emotionally laden outcomes…and the deci-
sion-making of youth is particularly susceptible to time pressure and emotion. . . .”). 
174  See generally Cynthia Alkon, The Right to Defense Discovery in Plea Bargaining Fifty 
Years after Brady v. Maryland, 38 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 407 (2014). 
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there should be further investigation or motions.175 Depriving a defense lawyer 
of discovery is a clear usurpation of the representation function. Doing so reduces 
the defense lawyer to merely a conduit for conveying the offer without the ability 
to provide any meaningful advice or to make meaningful counter-offers because 
the defense lawyer may not know enough about the case to do either. 
Prosecutors should also not be allowed to continue the practice of taking 
offers off the table if or when the defense files certain motions, such as search 
and seizure motions. Prosecutors often use the threat of withdrawing the offer to 
prevent defense lawyers from making motions, including, in some cases, to pre-
vent them from requesting discovery.176 The fact that the defense may want to 
explore the strength of the prosecution’s discovery and file motions should not 
result in offers being withdrawn. Prosecutors who engage in this practice are 
clearly usurping the defense attorney’s role, and can be acting to prevent effec-
tive assistance of counsel. The fact that the defendant may not prevail in the mo-
tion should not be dispositive in determining whether the prosecutor engaged in 
hard bargaining tactics. Search and seizure motions can be difficult to win, but 
there are good tactical reasons to file such motions, including that it may give 
the defense lawyer a better sense of how an individual police officer will be as a 
witness. If the prosecutor makes a direct threat to withdraw an offer when the 
defense files a motion, or states an intention to file a motion, that should be con-
sidered inappropriate hard bargaining.177  
B.   Threats to Add Charges or Enhancements 
Once a prosecutor has made a plea offer and the defense has rejected it, they 
should not be allowed to add additional charges or enhancements. Prosecutors 
should also not be allowed to threaten to add charges if the defense rejects the 
offer. As discussed above, the threat to add additional charges also acts to under-
mine the defense lawyer’s role.178 The challenge with establishing this as a clear 
rule is that it will likely lead to prosecutors adding enhancements and charges at 
the beginning of the case. This could have the effect of adding pressure on the 
defendant and being even more coercive because the first charges and potential 
maximum will be so much more serious. This challenge points out the reality 
that simply restricting prosecutorial hard bargaining tactics, in the absence of 
other substantive reforms to the criminal justice system, can be easily worked 
around by professionals in the system who choose to “game it.” What makes 
                                                        
175  I argue that a bright line for determining defense lawyer competency in the preparation 
phase of plea bargaining is whether the defense lawyer has adequately prepared the case, in-
cluding determining if there is any defense, and if there are any possible pre-trial motions. See 
generally Alkon, supra note 10, at 390. 
176  Id. at 396. 
177  Thank you to Professor James Stark for raising this question. 
178  See supra, Section VI.B. 
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these threats so powerful is that the existing laws allow for extreme penalties for 
acts that might not be so serious, as the Aaron Swartz example illustrates.179 
C.   Take-It-or-Leave-It Offers 
There can be times when it is appropriate for the prosecution to make a set 
plea offer and not negotiate further.180 The question would be why is the prose-
cutor refusing to negotiate? If it is to pressure the defendant to plead guilty, and 
the prosecutor is refusing to listen to new evidence or mitigating circumstances 
that call for a reconsideration of the plea offer, then it would be an unacceptable 
hard bargaining tactic. If the reason is simply that the case is standard, the offer 
is standard, and there is no reason to change it, this would not in and of itself 
constitute unacceptable prosecutorial hard bargaining. A district attorney’s office 
may have decided to adopt a policy to handle particular crimes in a uniform way. 
There are good policy arguments against both mandatory minimums and adopt-
ing such sweeping policies. However, looking at the totality of the circum-
stances, if the prosecutor’s office is making take-it-or-leave-it offers as part of a 
policy of making uniform offers, and not as part of an effort to pressure defend-
ants to take the plea deals, this would not cross the line in terms of hard bargain-
ing practices. 
D.   Threats to Seek the Death Penalty 
As discussed above, concern is raised when prosecutors threaten the death 
penalty to pressure defendants to accept plea deals when they have not already 
filed as a capital case. The challenge is the same as above in that a clear rule 
prohibiting prosecutors from filing later to seek death may just encourage more 
capital-case indictments earlier in the process and not reduce the actual number 
of times the threat of death is used to encourage defendants to take plea deals. A 
rule preventing later filing of capital charges could also work to undermine pros-
ecutors’ offices that have adopted policies to make sure their death prosecutions 
are well-considered and happen later in the process, not at the initial filing. How-
ever, it is time for the Court to move beyond a blanket acceptance of prosecutors 
threatening to seek the death penalty simply because the defendant is aware of 
the “relevant circumstances” and the result (death) would be a lawful penalty.181  
CONCLUSION 
The U.S. Supreme Court has, thus far, imposed few restrictions on prosecu-
torial hard-bargaining practices. In an era when the Court has started to show a 
willingness to examine the plea bargaining process more closely, it is time to 
                                                        
179  See supra, Section I.D. 
180  See, e.g., United States v. Morris, 633 F.3d 885, 889 (9th Cir. 2011) (“There is nothing 
fundamentally wrong with the prosecution’s decision to present its best offer up front.”). 
181  Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970). 
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focus attention on restricting some of the excesses in prosecutorial behavior. The 
criminal justice system gives prosecutors tremendous power. They can decide 
what charges and enhancements to file, and they can decide what plea offer, if 
any, to make. This power should not go unchecked. 
As this article has described, in labor cases, hard bargaining tactics are re-
stricted. In the context of labor negotiations, the goal is to encourage peaceful 
settlement of labor disputes with the recognition of the representation role of 
unions as an important part of that process. The stakes are no less important in 
criminal cases. It matters to individual defendants that they not be pressured or 
coerced into accepting deals that they do not want or that might not be in their 
best interest. It matters to individual defendants that the role of their defense 
lawyer not be usurped by prosecutorial hard bargaining tactics. It also matters to 
society at large that our criminal justice system function in a way that does not 
call into question its legitimacy. Extreme examples of prosecutorial hard bar-
gaining tactics, such as the cases of Marissa Alexander and Aaron Swartz, have 
raised questions of legitimacy. 
Deciding where and how to draw the line on prosecutorial hard bargaining 
tactics is not easy. However, it is time to begin the discussion and for the Court 
to begin looking more critically at prosecutorial behavior in plea bargaining. This 
article has suggested one possible argument to help encourage that movement in 
the most extreme examples of prosecutorial hard bargaining that risk undermin-
ing a defendant’s right to effective assistance of counsel. 
